Specieism: Treatment of My Kitten vs My Child
Should we treat our kitten different than our young child? How much protection do we owe the animals we own? And if they need to be protected against pain or death, why do we need to do that? Is it for our own comfort and peace of mind? Do our animals know the consequences of what we are deciding for them? Should non-human species of animals who are believed to be able to think be treated the same or differently than humans? If cattle can think, why do we kill them for food? If dogs think, why, in some cultures, they are killed for food? Is it fair for humans to behave in a different manner depending on what species of animals are being considered and acted upon? This is all bioethics and currently on a bioethics listserv these questions are being considered. One of the ethicists on the listserv wrote the following questions today which I am reproducing here. Maybe some visitor can provide an answer to one or more of my questions or those of the ethicist. ..Maurice.
Is it true that specieism is on a par morally with racism?
Singer thinks that there’s nothing wrong with human animals having sexual relations with non-human animals, e.g., the great apes. Is that true?
Is it true that we are as much responsible for evils we could have prevented as those we cause?
Non-human animals display specie preference (and sex preference). If specieism and sexism are inherently objectionable, shouldn’t we breed that out of them, if possible? If not, why not?
A non-human prey animal’s loss when killed by a non-human animal predator is the same as his loss when imposed by a human animal hunter. Why is predation by non-human animals Ok, but predation by human animal predators not-Ok?
If one objects to wearing the skins of animal martyrs on principle, mustn’t one object to accepting medical treatments developed at the cost of animal martyrs for the same reason?
And mustn’t one similarly object to accepting insurance coverage specifically targeted to offset the costs of products and services developed at the expense of animal martyrs?
Isn’t it perverse to favor further expansion of insurance coverage that fuels an industry based on the idea that non-human animals shall bear the initial costs of product development?
posted by Maurice Bernstein, M.D. @ 10:59:00 AM
4 comments
4 Comments:
Hi Maurice
Would you mind posting details of which listserv that is and how to join it? Sounds fascinating.
The ethicist you are quoting seems to have not made an important distinction between moral agents and non-agents. While it is the case we can have moral duties towards non-agents, it isn't the case that non-agents can have moral duties.
This answers several of their questions, such as number 4 & 5 because there is a morally relevant difference between most humans and most animals, because most humans are moral agents, most animals are not.
To make my point clearer, a moral agent is someone who is a subject of moral demands, in other words they are obliged to act morally. But not everything is a subject of moral demands, trees, stones, pieces of paper do not for example have to act charitably (presuming charity is a moral obligation). Instead they are outside the sphere of moral demands. Likewise you children, and some would say animals are not the sorts of things that are obliged to act morally. That is they are not moral agents. However this does not preclude us having moral duties towards them, since they can still be objects of morality, even if they are not subjects.
David, do you find a difference as a moral object between a tree and a rock? Should we treat a tree differently than a rock? Is the reason people are concerned about the human destruction of the rain forest is not because of a moral duty to the tree but for human's own self-interest in the loss of the rain forest? ..Maurice.
Hi Maurice
I personally don't. But then my view of the moral universe is rather complicated. On my view (I've blogged about it here: Guest Blogger: Moral Status of Rats)
what gives you moral status is the possession of any one of a set of three separately sufficient conditions:
1. Sentience (The ability to feel pain)
2. Self Awareness
3. Being capable of contract forming
So on this account there is no moral difference in themselves between a rock and a tree. However, insofar as humans and other creatures with moral status rely on the existence of that tree, or find it aesthetically pleasing or so on, then there are moral differences in how we ought to behave towards the tree and the rock. But these duties are second order, they are derived our duties towards beings with moral status.
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